This contribution describes a new class of arithmetic architectures for Galois elds GF(2 k ). The main applications of the architecture are public-key systems which are based on the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves. The architectures use a representation of the eld GF(2 k ) as GF((2 n ) m ), where k = n m. The approach explores bit parallel arithmetic in the sub eld GF(2 n ), and serial processing for the extension eld arithmetic. This mixed parallel-serial (hybrid) approach can lead to fast implementations. As the core module, a hybrid multiplier is introduced and several This paper is an extension of 1]. The bit parallel squarer architectures have been completely revised. 1 optimizations are discussed. We provide two di erent approaches to squaring. We develop exact expressions for the complexity of parallel squarers in composite elds which can have a surprisingly low complexity.
Introduction
Finite elds play an important role in public-key cryptography. Many public-key algorithms are either based on arithmetic in prime elds or on extension elds of GF (2) , denoted by GF(2 k ). Examples of schemes which can be based on Galois elds of characteristic two are discrete logarithms schemes (see, e.g., 2]), elliptic curve schemes 3], and systems based on hyperelliptic curves 4]. This contribution focuses on computer architectures for the latter two families of public-key algorithms. Schemes based on the assumed di culty of the discrete logarithm (DL) problem over (non-supersingular) elliptic curves should have extension degrees of k 160. These long word lengths required for public-key algorithms lead to relatively low performance which is widely recognized as a major shortcoming in practical applications. The provision of fast hardware architectures for arithmetic in Galois elds GF(2 k ) is thus of great interest. In the case of algorithms over GF(2 k ), addition can be realized with k bitwise exclusive OR operations. Addition is, thus, a fast and relatively inexpensive operation. The other eld operation, multiplication, on the other hand is very costly in terms of gate count and delay. Multipliers can be classi ed into bit parallel and bit serial architectures. The former ones compute a result in one clock cycle but have generally an area requirement of O(k 2 ). Bit serial multipliers compute a product in k clock cycles but have an area requirement of O(k).
The two types of architectures are a typical example of the space-time trade-o paradigm. The main idea of this contribution is the introduction of a new class of Galois eld arithmetic architectures which are faster than bit serial ones but with an area complexity which is considerably below the k 2 bound of bit parallel ones. It appears that avoiding the two extreme choices provided by bit parallel and bit serial architectures (very fast and large versus relatively slow and small) can lead to architectures with more optimized performance/cost characteristic for many applications. We will refer to the new arithmetic schemes as hybrid architectures. The principle of the architecture was rst introduced in 5, Chapter 6] . The reference, however, only describes a hybrid multiplier and does not address optimizations, hybrid and parallel squaring, exponentiation, and applications to cryptography as it is done here. The main application of the new architecture are systems based on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves. Note that cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm in GF(2 k ) might have weaknesses if k is composite, so that hybrid architectures are not applicable.
The outline of the remaining paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous approaches of nite eld architectures in general and of public-key architectures in particular. Section 3 introduces the general structure of the new multiplier architecture together with several optimizations. Section 4 describes two architecture options for hybrid squaring which enables the design of fast arithmetic units. Section 5 shows an architecture option which allows for a variable extension degree m. Section 6 shows the design and results of a proofof-concept ASIC implementation of an arithmetic unit. Section 7 concludes with a summary of results and a description of areas of application.
Previous Work
Important theoretical results on the complexity of nite eld multiplication are given in 6, 7] . The use of composite elds GF((2 n ) m ) for public-key schemes, more speci cally for elliptic curve systems, is described in 8, 9, 10]. All three references deal with software imple-mentations which explore table look-up for sub eld arithmetic. Neither reference mentions the application to hardware architectures.
Computer architectures for nite eld arithmetic have drawn considerable attention over the past decade. The majority of publications have concentrated so far on nite eld architectures for relatively small elds, thus being mainly relevant for the implementation of channel codes. The focus in the research literature has been on architectures for the arithmetic operations multiplication (see, e.g., 11, 12, 13]), inversion (see, e.g., 14, 15, 16] ), and exponentiation (see, e.g., 17, 18, 19] ). Multiplication in GF(2 k ) is usually considered the crucial operation which determines the speed or throughput of a cryptosystem. Finite eld architectures can be classi ed into bit serial (one output bit per clock cycle) and bit parallel ones (all output bits are computed within one clock cycle.) The vast majority of the proposed schemes are based on either of these two types. Architectures which are of hybridtype (partially serial, and partially parallel), as proposed here, have only be mentioned in the dissertation 5, Chapter 6] and in our earlier work 1]. A remotely related architecture is the digit-serial multiplier proposed in 20].
Another classi cation of Galois eld architectures is possible with respect to the basis representation of eld elements. The most popular representations are standard (or polynomial or canonical), normal basis, and dual basis. Each basis representation has certain advantages; polynomial and dual basis representations are well suited for bit parallel multipliers, whereas normal basis representation allows for very e cient exponentiation. There have have been a few attempts to compare di erent types of arithmetic architectures for Galois elds. In 21, 22, 23] multipliers in di erent basis representations are compared. The focus is mainly on relatively small elds. Reference 17] compares normal and standard basis exponentiation architectures which are relevant for public-key algorithms.
There is a relatively small number of published work on Galois eld architectures especially designed for cryptographic applications. Many of the bit serial architectures mentioned above, however, also extend to cryptographic applications. It should be noted that the O(k 2 ) complexity bound of most parallel multiplier architectures would result in unrealistically large arithmetic units for most public-key algorithms. So far, polynomial basis and normal basis representation have been used for cryptographic applications.
There are three reported implementations which gain their security from the discrete logarithm in nite elds. Reference 24] contains a detailed description of an implementation of an exponentiation unit in the eld GF (2 593 ), using an optimal normal basis representation of eld elements. Reference 25] deals with various aspects of bit serial architectures in Galois elds for cryptographic applications. An implementation of an exponentiation unit in GF (2 333 ) using polynomial basis representation is described. In addition, there is the early description of an implementation of a cryptosystem over GF (2 127 ) 26]. There have also been publications about successful implementations of elliptic curve systems in hardware. Reference 27] describes the realization of a non super-singular elliptic curve system over GF (2 155 ). Field elements are represented with respect to an optimal normal basis.
3 Hybrid Multipliers
General Architecture
This subsection describes the general structure of a hybrid multiplier architecture for Galois elds in standard basis. The critical operation in terms of system performance of almost all public-key algorithms is multiplication. Both exponentiation (in schemes based on the DL in nite elds) and the group operation for elliptic curves (in schemes based on the DL over elliptic curves) rely on nite eld multiplication as elementary function. The new class of architecture for arithmetic in GF(2 k ) will be based on the following two principles:
1. Representation of the eld GF(2 k ) as GF((2 n ) m ), where n m = k; 2. Application of bit parallel architectures to arithmetic in the sub eld GF(2 n ) and of a bit serial structure to arithmetic in the extension eld GF((2 n ) m ). The goal is to obtain an acceleration by reducing the number of clock cycles required for a eld multiplication. We consider arithmetic in an extension eld of GF(2 n ). The extension degree is denoted by m, so that the eld can be denoted by GF((2 n ) m ). This eld is isomorphic to GF(2 n ) x]=(P(x)), where P(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree m over GF(2 n ). In the following, a residue class will be identi ed with the polynomial of least degree in this class. If n = 1, the structure degenerates into the classical bit-serial MSB-rst architecture for multiplication in the eld GF(2 m ) (see, e.g., 28, 29] ). In this case all lines are onebit connections. The U operand is fed into the architectures in a bit serial manner, most signi cant bit rst. The product coe cients w i are available after m clock cycles, i.e., binary (n = 1) hybrid (n > 1) hybrid (n > 1), hybrid (n > 1), P(x) binary P(x) binary, comp. sub eld # AND 2k 2nk nk 3=4nk Table 1 : Gate, register, and clock requirements for multipliers in GF((2 n ) m ) multiplication of m bit operands requires m clock cycles. All hardware implementations of public-key cryptosystems we are aware of are designed with n = 1, i.e., m = k. For the large m occurring in public-key algorithms, the resulting processing time can be considerable. The complexity of the classical binary architecture with n = 1 is given in the second column of Table 1 where we consider the number of GF (2) multiplications (AND), additions (XOR), registers (in bits), and number of clock cycles for one eld multiplication, respectively. However, if the eld GF(2 k ) needed in a given cryptographic application allows a composite eld extension k = n m, n > 1, application of the same principal structure leads to the new architecture. In that case, all connections are n bit wide buses and all arithmetic is performed in the sub eld GF(2 n ). Assuming bit parallel architectures for the sub eld multiplication and addition in the LFSR, the result is now computed in m clock cycles. We name this architecture a hybrid multiplier. The hybrid architecture reduces the number of clock cycles for one multiplication by a factor of n = k=m.
One attractive feature of the hybrid architecture is that it is still highly regular and modular which are very desirable features for VLSI realizations 30]. The multiplier can be built from m identical modules to which we will refer as \slices". Each slice consists of two sub eld multipliers, one sub eld adder, and three n-bit registers. The only global communication required is an n-bit feedback path which is common to all slices. The architecture allows also full exibility with respect to the eld polynomial P(x). Any monic m degree polynomial over GF(2 n ) can be loaded into the architecture. The eld polynomial can be changed during operation after each multiplication if desired. The complexity of the general hybrid architecture is given in the third column of Table 1 , where a bit parallel sub eld multiplier with a complexity of n 2 AND gates and n 2 ?1 XOR gates 11] is assumed. It can be seen that the number of logic gates increases by roughly a factor of 2n compared to the traditional approach, whereas the number of registers is the same. The major advantage of the hybrid architecture is that the number clock cycles for one multiplication is reduced by a factor of n. The hybrid multiplier explores thus the time-space trade-o paradigm, where the degree of the trade-o (performance versus complexity) is determined by the eld decomposition n m. The following section describes two optimizations of the general architecture which result in considerably reduced gate counts.
Optimizations 3.2.1 Binary Field Polynomials
In many public-key algorithms, in particular for elliptic curves schemes, the extension degree m can be chosen such that gcd(n; m) = 1. In this case a eld polynomial P(x) which is irreducible over GF(2) is also irreducible over GF(2 n ) 31]. In particular, we can now choose a P(x) with coe cients from GF(2). Field polynomials with binary coe cients result in a hybrid multiplier with drastically improved complexity. A block diagram of the improved multiplier is shown in Figure 2 .
In slice i, the signal from the feedback path is either passed through (coe cient p i = 1) or not processed (coe cient p i = 0). Hence, in each slice, the general multiplier with the polynomial coe cient p i is now replaced by a binary n-bit switch. A switch can be realized e ciently in digital hardware. In a simple realization the switch can be built by n AND gates, but more e cient realizations, e.g., through transmission gates 30], are also possible. If we neglect the switch complexity relatively to the other components, the over-all complexity is given in the fourth column of Table 1 .
The architecture for binary eld polynomials reduces the gate complexity roughly by half and the number of register bits by about one third, compared to the general hybrid multiplier It should be noted that the architecture still allows exibility with respect to the eld polynomial. Any irreducible polynomial with coe cients from GF(2) of degree m can be loaded into the architecture and serve as the eld polynomial. Also, the high degree of modularity and regularity is preserved with the optimization. A further optimization is possible if the eld polynomial is xed. In this case switches are replaced by a connection or no connection. The optimum eld polynomials for this option are sparse ones, in particular trinomials and pentanomials. Note that an irreducible trinomial (a polynomial of the form x m + x t + 1) or pentanomial (a polynomial of the form x m + x t 3 + x t 2 + x t 1 + 1) exists for all values of m, 2 m 10000 32].
Composite Sub eld Multipliers
The gate complexities of the hybrid multiplier is now mainly determined by the bit parallel sub eld multiplier. Applying a more e cient architecture to the sub eld multiplication can thus be relevant for reducing the over-all system complexity.
So far we assumed a sub eld architecture with a complexity of n 2 AND gates and n 2 ? 1 XOR gates. The vast majority of bit parallel architectures has at least these gate counts. However, the complexity can be further reduced by applying the bit parallel architecture described in 33, 34] . The multipliers are based on a representation of the sub eld GF(2 n ) through another eld decomposition GF((2 o ) p ), where n = o p. In particular, for values of n = 6; : : : ; 14, n even, a representation of GF(2 n ) = GF( (2 n=2 ) 2 ) will lead to highly e cient architectures. This range of values for n appears to be attractive for practical applications such as elliptic curve cryptosystems. Elements of the sub eld are now represented as polynomials with a maximum degree of one with coe cients from GF (2 n=2 ). The complexity of one sub eld multiplication can be reduced to #AND = 3=4n 2 and #XOR 3=4n 2 + 2n ? 3 34] .
It should be noted that for the speci c value of n = 8, it has been shown 23] that a multiplier based on the decomposition GF( (2 4 ) 2 ) requires in fact a considerably smaller number of gate equivalences in an ASIC implementation than architectures based on GF (2 8 ).
At the same time, the former architecture was found to be faster than the latter ones which is an attractive feature since the sub eld multiplier is in the critical path of the architecture.
The structure of a hybrid multiplier with a decomposed sub eld GF( (2 n=2 ) 2 ) is still given by Figure 2 but the complexity is reduced to the expressions shown in the rightmost column of Table 1 . The introduction of the sub eld decomposition has thus reduced the gate complexity by roughly 25%. If the complexity after the two optimization is compared with the one of the bit serial architecture given in the second column it can be seen that the time performance (clock cycles) improves by a factor of n, whereas the gate complexities increase only by a factor of 3=8n (AND) and 3=4n (XOR), respectively.
Comparison to Normal Base Multipliers
Some implementations of public-key schemes over elds GF(2 k ) use a normal basis (NB) representation of eld elements 24, 27] . The computational complexity for one multiplication depends heavily on the speci c eld polynomial 35]. A lower complexity bound, however, is given for irreducible polynomials which have a corresponding optimum normal basis 36]. Assuming an optimum normal basis for non-composite elds GF(2 k ), the complexity is given by #AND = k, #XOR = 2k ? 2, and #CLK = k. The NB multiplier requires thus n times as many clock cycles as the hybrid multiplier but has a lower gate count. Other advantages of the hybrid architectures are that the eld polynomial can be changed and that the eld extension m can be alterable, as will be explained in Section 5. However, a major advantage of a NB is that squaring can be accomplished through a simple cyclic shift whereas squaring with the hybrid architectures is more costly as will be described in the following section.
Squaring and Exponentiation
Besides multiplication, another arithmetic operation of importance for the implementation of public-key algorithms is squaring. Systems based on the DL problem for nonsupersingular elliptic curves require multiplications, squarings and one inversion, with respect to time-critical arithmetic, per group operation if a ne coordinates are used. A popular method for inversion in hardware is based on Fermat's little theorem, according to which A ?1 = A 2 k ?2 ; 8A 2 GF(2 k ); A 6 = 0. Although the extended Euclidean algorithm has a better theoretical performance, it requires more operands which in turn need more registers and control logic. It can thus be less attractive for hardware implementations. An attractive option for implementing Fermat's little theorem is the use of the standard squareand-multiply algorithm 37]. It should be noted that its derivation such as the k-ary or sliding window method require additional register and control logic which is a drawback for hardware implementations. If the inputs to the square-and-multiply algorithm are denoted by A and e and the output is the value A e , each iteration stage of the algorithm performs one of the two operations:
1. Multiply result of previous iteration with A.
Square result of previous iteration.
The hybrid multiplier architecture from the previous section can be applied to the rst operation. In this section, two architectures for squaring a result of a preceding multiplication (or squaring) will be developed which dovetail with the multiplier architecture.
Hybrid Squaring
The rst architecture is based on the application of the general multiplier from Section 3 to squaring. We assume that the variable to be squared is contained in the registers w i ; i = 0; 1; : : : ; m?1, of a hybrid multiplier as a result of a preceding multiplication or squaring. In order to square this variable we must assure that its coe cients are available as both inputs of the multiplier. This is achieved by the following two operations: A corresponding hardware architecture is shown in Figure 3 . It can be seen that the squaring functionality can be added to the hybrid multiplier with a modest amount of additional hardware. In every slice two switches must be added. Globally, a single control unit must be added to the system. The switches sp perform the initial parallel loading of the v i registers. The switches ss allow for the generation of the global input coe cients during the multiplication cycles. The control logic assures that switch ss m?1?i (and only switch ss m?1?i ) is closed during cycle i. The control logic can be realized as a counter with dlog 2 me bits and a (dlog 2 me){to{m decoder.
The squaring functionality can be added to all three multiplier options discussed in Section 3. As stated earlier, switches can be realized very e ciently in ASIC implementations. The computational complexity of the expanded architecture is thus essentially the same as the hybrid multiplier complexity. It should be noted that a single squaring requires the same time as a general multiplication, namely m clock cycles. This is a major drawback compared to normal basis architectures which realize squaring in a single clock cycle by means of a cyclic shift. The following section introduces a much faster but more costly approach to squaring. 
Parallel Squaring
Exponentiation with a k bit exponent requires k ?1 squarings and on average not more than (k ? 1)=2 multiplications. Hence, a squaring architecture which requires fewer clock cycles than the one from the previous section can greatly improve the performance of a public-key system involving exponentiation. In the following we assume again that the input operand for the squaring is being held in the w registers of the hybrid multiplier. The architecture computes the result T(x) = W 2 (x) in one clock cycle, and puts the t i coe cients in the w i registers. For the development of a parallel squarer, i.e., squaring within one clock cycle, we note that 31] T(x) = W 
Complexities
In order to provide complexities for the two operations described above, we introduce the following theorem. Lemmas 1 and 2 will then allow us to develop gate counts for both operations under the assumption that the two eld polynomials P(x) and Q(y) are trinomials. Q(y) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n over GF (2) . P(x) is an irreducible polynomial over GF(2 n ) of degree m, with binary coe cients, as described in Subsection 3.2.1. From the above theorem we can derive the following lemma which gives the complexity for squaring an element in the sub eld GF(2 n ) which is the rst operation in a realization of (1). Lemma from which the proof follows directly through Theorem 1. Note that an addition in GF (2) is an XOR.
For the second operation required for a parallel realization of (1) the following lemma provides complexity expressions. (1) if it is taken into consideration that each sub eld addition can be realized with n XOR gates.
Example
As an example for a parallel squaring architecture, let's consider the eld GF(( 2 15 ) 11 ) = GF (2 165 ). This eld order is highly interesting for elliptic curve cryptosystems such as suggested, e.g., in the upcoming IEEE P1363 standard. The eld polynomials are Q(y) = y 2 15 ) which can be realized with 6 15 = 90 XOR. The required interconnections for the parallel squarer in GF((2 n ) 11 ), including the 6 adders, is shown in Figure 5 . Each block represents a cell for parallel sub eld squaring as shown in Figure 4 . Note that each line denotes an n-bit wide bus. Although the interconnection is irregular we would like to stress that the gate complexity is relatively low. Parallel squaring in GF(( 2 15 ) 11 ) can be realized with 11 7 + 90 = 167 XOR. This gate count can be neglected compared to the gate costs of a multiplier for this eld. 
Variable Field Order
In some cryptographic applications it is desirable to allow for an alterable order of the underlying nite eld. For instance, in elliptic curve systems, the order of the point group | which is central for determining the complexity of solving the discrete logarithm problem | is approximately equal to the order of the underlying nite eld due to Hasse's Theorem 38] . An implementation with variable eld order allows thus variable security levels depending on the application. If we impose the restriction that the sub eld order 2 n is xed, architectures with variable extension degree m can be designed from the hybrid multiplier and the hybrid squarer. We can essentially apply the architecture in Figure 1 to a design that allows for variable m. With a modest amount of additional hardware, an exponentiation architecture with m slices can be programmed to use s slices, where s m. A corresponding slice is shown in Figure 6 . In order to perform arithmetic in the eld GF((2 n ) s ) with the m-slice architecture, the connection between slice s ? 1 and slice s is open, and the output of register w s?1 is redirected to the feedback data bus. This can be done with one switch st (see Figure 6) which connects the output of slice s ? 1 (i in the gure) to either the next slice or to the feedback loop, but not both. Since the feedback happens now between slices s ? 1 and s, only s slices are used to perform a multiplication. Slices s and above are unused because there is no communication between them and the lower s slices. In order to gain further experience with the new class of nite eld architectures, we performed a proof-of-concept hardware implementation. We implemented the most general multiplier architecture described in Section 3.1 and the hybrid squarer from Section 4.1, with variable m and n = 8 39] . One slice of our implementation has thus the structure shown in Figure 6 . We applied a full-custom design approach in CMOS technology using the MOSIS design tools. The fabrication facilities available for this research project enabled us to use 2 m technology. Obviously, this imposes a serious speed limitation on the prototype compared to current technologies. However, our goal was not to compete with commercial or semi-commercial implementations but rather to demonstrate the principle feasibility of the architectures, and to obtain reliable resource and timing estimations for this technology. Similarly we did not implement an entire public-key system. Our main interest was to study the underlying arithmetic architectures.
For the two sub eld multipliers in each design we used the architecture of reference 11]. The implementation uses transmission gates (X-gates) to discern whether slice i is the nal one in the chain or not. The transmission gates o er better switching characteristic than a pass transistor implementation 30], but still introduce a delay in passive mode. The coe cients of V (x); W(x), and P(x) are stored in 8-bit latches. This kind of memory requires less area than an SRAM implementation. While other types of memory elements can operate faster than a simple latch, they also consume more area.
The test ASICs that we implemented contains four slices, each of which requires 3040 transistors or 760 gate equivalences. We estimated that by using the optimized architecture in Section 3.2.1, the gate count would roughly be reduced by a factor of 1=2 and only 400 gates would be needed per slice. This estimate indicates that hybrid architectures with a sub eld of n = 8 are feasible even for relatively large eld orders. An example of a eld order which is well suited for an elliptic curve cryptosystem is k = 152 = 8 19. For this eld order we obtain an estimate of about 8000 gate equivalences for a multiplier and (hybrid) squaring architecture which already includes I/O registers. These would even allow for a realization with reprogrammable logic (FPGA, EPLD).
Our implementation allows a clock rate of 3.5 Mhz. This clock rate was obtained by measuring the maximum path delay of the chips that were fabricated using a Tektronix VLSI tester. A multiplication in GF(2 k ) with k = 152 = 8 19 takes thus 5:4 sec. Although we did not implement an elliptic curve system we can derive the following rough estimates: Using projective coordinates a point addition requires 14 multiplications or 75:6 sec, and a point doubling 12 multiplications or 64:8 sec 40]. A point multiplication with a 152-bit integer would then take about 11 msec on average, using the standard double-and-add algorithm. This estimate does not take any control overhead or additions into account, but also ignores possible improvement of the double-and-add algorithm (k-ary, sliding window). We would like to stress that the implementation is by no means speed optimized (but area optimized) and that we used relatively slow technology. We expect that the use of the parallel squaring architecture from Section 4.2, state-of-the-art technology (e.g., 0.35 m or smaller), and application of the faster sub eld multiplier from Section 3.2.2 would lead to a very competitive performance of the arithmetic unit.
Conclusions and Applications
We developed new types of multipliers and squarers for Galois elds GF(2 k ). The multiplication and squaring architectures are designed such that exponentiation units can be built which are of central interest for public-key cryptosystems. The underlying idea is to represent the eld GF(2 k ) by GF((2 n ) m ), k = n m, and to apply bit parallel architectures to arithmetic in the sub eld and a serial approach to the extension eld arithmetic. The main feature of the new hybrid architectures is that they have the potential of being considerably faster than previously reported public-key architectures for nite eld arithmetic. Hybrid multiplication requires only m clock cycles as opposed to k in traditional fully bit serial approaches. The principal feasibility of the approach was demonstrated in an ASIC implementation for the eld GF((2 8 ) m ), m variable. It appears that hybrid architectures could result in improved performance for several important public-key schemes.
The most attractive public-key schemes for the new architecture are those based on elliptic curves. Some of the reported implementation of elliptic curve systems over Galois elds GF(2 k ) already use a composite eld extension k (e.g., k = 155 27], or k = 176 9, 10]), although not all of them explore sub eld arithmetic. This situation is ideally suited for hybrid architectures. Also, since values of k = 150 : : : 250 provide high security against currently known attacks, hybrid architectures for elliptic curves can be realized with a moderate gate complexity.
Another type of cryptosystem which can be used in conjunction with our architecture are those based on hyperelliptic curves 4]. Secure one-way functions can be built with k < 100. This range of eld orders seems also very well suited for hybrid architectures.
Finally we would like to stress that the DL in nite elds might be insecure for composite Galois elds GF((2 n ) m ) 41]. Hence it is not recommended to apply the hybrid architecture to such schemes, which include, for instance, the classical Di e-Hellman key exchange protocol.
A Proof for Theorem 1 
